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Abstract
When the number of agents in an economy is finite, the allocation rule
induced by Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) can be strategically
manipulated. Implementation of REE has been shown to be possible in a
certain class of environments. A drawback of these results is that the
mechanisms employed have infinite-dimensional message spaces. Given that
information transmission is generally costly, such mechanisms may be
infeasible. This paper shows that having more than two informed agents is
sufficient to guarantee implementation of REE using a finite-dimensional
message space. There is a large class of interesting economic problems of
asymmetric information that meet this condition. The mechanism introduced
here generates an allocation and a signal and the solution concept is a
refinement of Bayesian equilibria. Since the mechanism translates data
from an infinite-dimensional class of environments to finite dimensions,
its informational complexity is minimal within the class of all mechanisms.
Thus, the various desiderata of a price mechanism are restored in a manner
that is feasible from the viewpoint of incentive-compatibility and the
constraints imposed by costly information transmission.
The author is grateful to William Thomson, Harold Cole and Dimitrios
Diamantaras for their comments on an earlier version of the paper. The
usual disclaimer applies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The price mechanism occupies a central position in the theory of
resource allocation. A complex body of information about individual
preferences are encoded into simple finite-dimensional messages such as
price and demand vectors; partially informed agents draw inferences about
the knowledge of informed agents from observable aggregate statistics such
as prices; markets clear; and some measure of "efficiency" is achieved in
terms of allocation of the economy's resources. An allocation rule induced
by the Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) of an economyis, however,
subject to strategic manipulability when the number of agents in the
economy is finite — or at least "not very large". This criticism has been
levelled against a wide class of allocation rules (see Hurwicz (1972)).
This paper provides a set of sufficient conditions under which the REE
allocations perform their primary economic duties and are feasible given
constraints imposed by incentives and costly communication; they are
implementable by a mechanism which preserves (i) finite-dimensional message
transmission, (ii) full information revelation through prices, (iii)
market-clearing and (iv) immunity to strategic manipulations and, thereby,
ex post efficiency.
It has been well established that the so-called incentives problem
leads to inefficiencies in resource allocation. Recent literature on the
design of incentive-compatible mechanisms under asymmetric information has
addressed this issue and sufficient conditions for the implementability of
REE have been provided. These conditions restore the properties (ii)-(iv),
given above, of REE allocations at the cost of property (i), i.e. that
relating to informational complexity. The size of a mechanism's message
space (if it is Euclidean, then its dimensionality) serves as the measure
of informational complexity. It measures the maximum amount of information
that the central planner must be prepared to handle. In general, the bulk
of the mechanism design literature (which is primarily influenced by
applications of the Revelation Principle) ignores the problem of
informational complexity. The REE-implementation mechanisms suggested by
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) and Wettstein (1987) are enhanced revelation
schemes where agents report their private information to the game designer
as part of their messages. In typical economic problems, where agents may
have continuous and convex preferences, this amounts to using an
infinite-dimensional message space. Given that information transmission is
generally costly (as evidenced by the existence of limited channels of
communication and bounds on the abilities of both humans and computers to
process information), such mechanisms may be infeasible. Thus, we lose one
of the most crucial properties of the price mechanism.
The literature on resource allocation (Hurwicz (1977), Mount and
Reiter (1974)), organization theory (Marschak (1986)), accounting (Melumad
and Reichelstein (1987)), among others, have emphasized the concern for
minimizing the informational costs of allocation mechanisms. Recent work
on combining the informational and incentive aspects (Williams (1986),
Reichelstein and Reiter (1988), Saijo (1988), Chakravorti (1987)) has
investigated the possibilities of devising mechanisms that are immune to
strategic manipulation and economize on the amounts of information that
need to be transmitted.
In this paper, we define a set ??, which is a collection of
state-contingent REE allocations, and address the following question: under
what conditions can we devise a mechanism whose set of equilibria coincides
with 1R and whose message space is of finite dimensionality? We shall refer
to this property, in the sequel, as "finite implementation". It appears
that some form of restriction on the informational structure would be
necessary. The result obtained here is that a sufficient condition for
finite implementation of REE in economies with fully and partially informed
agents is that there be more than two fully informed agents. This
condition is met in many economic models of interest, for example, those
which analyze transactions between several buyers and sellers (of used
cars, skilled labor, etc.) where the sellers have accurate information
about the quality of the product and the buyers are uninformed or adverse
selection problems with a single principal and multiple agents.
In terms of the design of a mechanism, we apply some ideas hinted at
in Green and Laffont (1987). They indicate that the concept of rational
expectations can be blended with game-theoretic solution concepts in games
where agents are not committed a priori to their strategies and can revise
them after observing some aggregate statistic which is generated as an
outcome of the game. The mechanism devised here is a game whose outcome
function recommends an allocation and a price. An agent derives utility
from the allocation and acquires information from the price. The
combination yields an expected utility from the outcome of the game to the
agent. The set of Bayesian equilibra is refined to allow only those
equilibria that survive any new information acquired after observation of
the outcome of the game. We call this refinement Rational Expectations
Bayesian Equilibria (REBE).
Some final comments are in order.
We shall concentrate on fully revealing REE and REBE. The issue of
existence of REE does not constrain us here. The implementation problem is
interesting only in economies in which the set "R is non-empty. REBE will
be shown to exist.
We have shown a link between the game-theoretic concept of posterior
implementability and the economic ideas of rational expectations. As
Grossman (1981) points out, the Walrasian paradigm does not provide for the
possibility that uninformed agents may acquire information by observing
prices. Similarly, a mechanism which does not take into account the fact
that the outcome of the mechanism may convey information to the agents is
subject to the criticism that this endogenously generated information would
destroy the incentive properties of the mechanism.
Following Green and Laffont's (1987) formulation of the problem, we
deal with single-stage normal form games here. A multi-stage version with
an explicit recontracting process can be constructed. The latter approach
is, however, rather cumbersome.
An issue not dealt with here is that of establishing necessary
conditions for finite implementability. A crucial question along these
lines would be: is it necessary to have an informed agent to achieve finite
implementability in a wide class of economies?
Finally, we note that once we have reduced an implementation problem
defined for an infinite-dimensional class of environments to one of finite
implementation, the level of informational complexity is also minimal in
the class of all mechanisms. Any finite message space can be smuggled into
a one-dimensional space by applying the inverse of an appropriate
space-filling function and then using the function itself to retrieve the
original data. An interesting question, of course, would be the
investigation of finite implementation using mechanisms that obey certain
smoothness restrictions (see Reichelstein and Reiter (1988)) which rule out
such information smuggling.
The next section defines the economy. Section 3 defines the
implementation problem. The result is given in the final section.
2. THE ECONOMY
The class of economies we consider has l(i 2) goods and n(^ 2) agents.
A^ is the set of agents and 9 is a set of states of the world. We assume
that 9 is of the form 9 = x 9 . Each agent i e N is given by a list <u
,i€N i i
0)
, 9
, g > where u : \R x9^IRisi's VNM utility function, w g R is
i i 1 i + i ++
i's initial endowment, 9 is the space in which Vs private information
i
about 9 resides and q : 9 ^ (0, 1] is i's prior probability distribution on
i
9. All the entries in this list are common knowledge, in the sense of
Aumann (1976). Without loss of generality, assume that 9 is finite.
i can derive a posterior probability distribution on 9 using the
function q' defined by an application of Bayes' Law on q. q'iQ\ H)
denotes the probability that i assigns to the state d given his/her
observation of an event H. An allocation is a random variable /: Q ^ A.
In the sequel, we use V if , H) to denote 7^, ^g'(e'| H)u(/(e'), 9'). A
1 i ^9 e9^i ' i i
sub-group of agents, J Q N is fully informed, i.e. for all J g J, for all 9
e 9, g'(9| 9 ) = 1.
It is assumed that for all i e N and all z e \R , u is strictly
i + i
increasing in z . We shall write ix ) as >: and ix ) as >: and^
i i iGN j jGN\<i} -i
y 0) as n. Let A = {z € R^": Y z = Q} and A = {z e R^: z :^ Q}. ^
^iGN I + ^iGN i i 1 + i
= if: Q ^ A where / = (/ ) and Vi g N, V9, 9' g 9, 9 = 9' => / (9) =
i iGN i i i
/.(9')} is the Joint consumption space. A price function is a random
variable p: G -> IR . J' is the space of all price functions. Given (9, p)
& e X T, let B {p(Q)) = {/(e) € A: p(e)/ (e) = p(e)o> , f e ^} be Vs
i ill i
constrained budget set.
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (fully revealing), written as REE,
is a pair (/, p) € ^ x J' satisfying the following conditions:
(i) for all i € iV and all € 6, / maximizes V if , (9 , p(e)))
subject to /.(9) € B {p(9)),
(ii) for all i e iV and all 9 e 9, q'(9| (9 , piQ))) = 1.
i ' i
Let ^ = {f € ^: 3(/, p) € ^ X ^ such that (/, p) is an REE>.
REMARK: This notion of an REE is a little different from the original
concept initiated by Radner (1967), Green (1972) and Lucas (1974). The
budget set used in our definition is constrained by the total endowment.
The allocations generated by the two concepts coincide in the interior of
A. This modification follows a similar modification of the Walrasian
correspondence due to Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984). In the
absence of this constraint on the budget set we would run into
non-implementability problems.
3. FINITE IMPLEMENTATION
Let M denote a set of messages for i € N. A mechanism, n, is a
i
n 1
triple {N, M, ^>. M is a message space defined by x. M., and ^: M -> R x
i€N i +
R
I 12
is an outcome function. Let ^ (m) and ^ (m) denote the projections of
r» 7 7
^(m) on R and R respectively. Agent i's strategy is a function s.: 9. ^
+ + i i
M , Let S denote i's strategy space with S = X S .
i 1
e>j t^ i€N i
Given ji = {N, M, ^}, a Rational Expectations Bayesian Equilibrium
(fully revealing), written as REBE, for fi is a strategy s € S satisfying
the following conditions:
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(i) there exists p e T such that ^ os = p,
(ii) for all i € N, for all 9 6 8, for all s' € S , V (£^os, (9
,
i i i ^i i'
pie))) 2: l'j(?M5;, s_^), (9^, pie))) and
(iii) for all i € AA, for all 9 e 9, g'(9| (9 , pie))) = 1.
Let &in) = if e ^: 3s € S such that s is an REBE of fx and ^os = f).
\i = {N, M, ^} is said to finitely implement REE if
(i) Ji. = &iii) and
(ii) there exists a positive integer t such that M £ R .
REMARK: The notion of a mechanism defined here extends the concept of a
game form, introduced by Gibbard (1973), which defines an allocation
mechanism in economic environments. A mechanism /i, as defined above,
determines a signal as well as an allocation. The concept of REBE refines
the set of Bayesian equilibria of /i. The former retains those equilibria
that survive even when agents are not committed a priori to their
strategies and can revise them after observing the outcome of the game.
Correspondingly, the notion of implementation is an application of
posterior implementability (Green and Laffont (1987)).
4. THE RESULT
THEOREM: If \J\ > 2, then there exists a mechanism }i which finitely
implements REE.
REMARK: Thus far, in the literature, finite implementation has been shown
to be possible for the Walrasian correspondence using Nash equilibrium as
8
the solution concept (Hurwicz (1979), Schmeidler (1980)). From a Bayesian
standpoint, the concept of Nash equilibrium is interpreted as an solution
concept for games of complete information.
REMARK: By the Revelation Principle, a necessary condition for
implementation of REE is that every / in ^ must satisfy an incentive
compatibility constraint. An even stronger condition has been shown to
necessary by Blume and Easley (1987): public predictability of information,
i.e. the private information of in - 1) agents taken together reveals the
information of the remaining agent. This condition is satisfied by the
assumption that | J | > 2.
m
The proof of the theorem is by way of construction of fi with the
desired properties. Choose a subset K of J with \K\ =3.
vi € AT, M = {s(e ) = (sVe ;, sVe ;, s^re )) € a xir^xiR:s € s , e
i i i i i i i i i i + + i i i
The following definitions will be used to simplify the notation:
Let 8 € 9 be given.12 3 I
s (Q ) = is (d ), s (e ), s (Q )) satisfies Property a\i if
-i -i j j j j j j j€N\(i}
36 € R^ such that Vj € K\{l}, s^O ) = 8 and
+ j j
(i) (s^ ie ), Q - I , s\q )) € a
-i -i '^jCNXd) j j
(ii) Vj € N\{i}, s^{9) =
(iii) Vj € N\{i}, s\6 ) € B (5)
j j j
Let 5 (s(0)) = 5 such that 3l, j € K with s^(e ) = s^(e ) = 5.
i i j j
Let Lisie)) = {i e AT: Vj € N, s^iG ) ^ s^iQ )}.
1 i j j
Let denote a vector of zeros in IR .
+
r> 1
^: M ^ \R X R is defined by the rules given in Figures 1 and 2.
+ +
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.]
REMARK: The agents call out demand and price vectors and a number in IR .
Only the prices announced by the members of K matter. If any two of the
members of K agree on a price, that price is posted by the game designer
2
via the function ^ . The method of proof will be as follows. It will be
shown that in an REBE, at least two members of K will, indeed, agree on a
price. This price conveys the information held by these agents to the
uninformed agents. Every REBE allocation is an REE allocation and vice
versa. The proof of the theorem is given by the following lemmata.
LEMMA I: ^ Q Si^i ).
Proof of Lemma 1^ Choose (/, p) e 9- x tP such that (/, p) is a REE. To show
*
that / e Si^i ), consider s e S such that for all i € K, and all 9 € 9,
s (e ) = (/ (e), pie), O) and for all i e N\{K} and all 6 e 9, s (6 ) =
i i 1 i i
(/ (e), s^(e ), 0). We can write 5 (s(e)) = pie) for all 9 e 9. Observe
i i i
that for all i € N and all 9 e 9, s (9 ) satisfies Property a|i. Hence
Cases 2.1 and A apply. Thus, for all 9 € 9, ^isie)) = ifie), pie)).
1 2
Consider unilateral deviation by some i € iV to an arbitrary s' = is[ , s\ ,
3
s' ) € S . Choose some 9 € 9. There are two possibilities:
i i
(i) (s'^(9 ), / (9)) € A. Case 2 and Case A apply. Since 5 (s(9)) =
i i -i ^^
-^
5*(s'(9), s (9 )), ^hs'ie), s ie )) € {/(9), 0)} and ^^is\ie),
i i -i -i i i i -i -i i i i i
s .(9.)) = p(9)).
-1 1
(ii) {s'^9), / ie)) ^ A. Case 1 and Case A apply. ^^is'ie),
i i -i i i i
»
s (9 )) € {s'^(9), ui). Since 5 isie)) = 5 (s'(9 ), s (9 )),
-i -i i i i i i -i -i
?V(9^), s_,ie)) = ipie)).
Given that in case of possibility (ii) ^^(s(9)) € Bip(e)), by
definition of an REE, for i e K, it is clear that unilateral deviation to
10
s' makes i no better off. For i € N\K, the same argument holds once we
i
take account of the fact that in every 9 € 0, ^ (s(G)) = p(e) is fully
*
revealing. By definition, / € g'(fi ).
LEMMA 2: Si^i ) c ^.
Proof of Lemma 2^ Choose s € g(ji ). We need to show that ^ °s e 'R. We
shall first prove the following claim:
CLAIM: Let s € &(ii ) be given. For all Q e e, ^^(s(e)) ^ 0.
Proof of Claim: Choose i ^ N and 9 € 0. Suppose ^ (s(9 )) ^ Q and
^ (s(9 )) = 0. Given |iV| > 2, such an i exists. Consider an alternative
1 3
strategy for i, s' € S where for all 9 € s' (9 ) = n and s' (9 ) >
s^iQ ) for all J € N. By definition of REBE, for all 9 € 0, ^^{s{9)) is
fully revealing. In addition, ^ (s(9 )) = informs i that Case B applies,
*
i.e. there exists no J e N such that s [9 ) satisfies Property oc\j.
*
Thus, i is fully informed that in state 9
,
Case 2.2.1 will apply and by
the assumption that u is strictly increasing in z , Vs utility is
i i
*
strictly greater in state 9 after the deviation to s' . This contradicts
i
*
the hypothesis that s € Si^i ).
Proof of Lemma 2 (Contd.): Given the claim proved above, for all 9 € 0,
s(9) is such that Case A is satisfied. Thus, it is common knowledge that
for all 9 € 0, there exists i € N such that s (9 ) satisfies Property
-i -i
a|i. Also, there exists p € T such that for all 9 € 0, ^^(s(9)) = 5 (s(9))
= p(9). Choose i € N. Consider a unilateral deviation by i to s' € S
i i
defined such that for all 9 € 0, s'^9 ) e B ip(e)) and s'^{9 ) > s^i9 )
i i i i i j j
for all J € N\{i}.' By construction, either Case 1.1 or Case 2.2.1 applies,
i.e ^^(s'(9 ), s (9 )) = s'^9 ) for all 9 € 0. By definition of REBE,
i i -i -i i i
11
for all e € e. V<:s\^, (e.. pO))) ^ V.(^os. (8^. p(e))).
since this holds
for all s\\9) e BSp(e)), we conclude that ^os € ??.
12
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Let m = s(e) = ((s (9 ), s (9 ), s (9 )) be given.
i i i i i i i€N ^
Figure 1: Rules for determining ^ (_m2
Case U 3i € N such that (i) s (9) ^ A, (ii) m satisfies Property a|i.
Case 1.1
(i) she ) € B (5 (m)) and
i i i
(ii) Urn) = ii)
i
^\m) = (s|(9^). (£2 - s (9 ) .i i )
(n-l)
Case 1.2
Otherwise
-y
^ (m) = (J
Case 2:
Otherwise
Case 2.1
(i) s\e) € A
(ii) \^i € N, m satisfies Property ali
-i '
Case 2.2
Otherwise
^\m) = s^(9)
Case 2.2.1
3i € N such that
L(m) = ii}
^\m) = , l,^ . (Q - s (9 ) .(s (9 , i i )
1 i
(n - 1)
Case 2.2.2
Otherwise
^
^ (m) = 0)
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Figure 2: Rules for determining ^ {ml
Case A:
3i € N such that m satisfies Property a
|
i
r(m) = 5 (m)
Case B:
Otherwise
r(m) =
16



